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Abstract
It is suggested that individual behavior under ambiguity, or knightian
uncertainty, may represent an alternative explanation for contractual
incompleteness with respect to the traditional approach in terms of
transactions costs. This paper aims at showing that the introduction of
ambiguity in the economic analysis of contracts may be very fruitful. In
particular, we analyze how ambiguity affects the optimal compensation
scheme in a principal-agent framework, where the principal cannot observe
the agent’s effort and, contrary to standard assumptions, is ambiguity-
averse.  Also, our model makes it possible to generalize the Mukerji (1998)
approach to contractual incompleteness. In fact, it shows that incomplete
contracts are costly and that, before reaching the conclusion that ambiguity
leads to contractual incompleteness, their costs should be compared with
those of complete contracts, other things being equal.
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SUBJECTIVE AMBIGUITY AND MORAL HAZARD
 IN A PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL
Marcello Basili∗ and Maurizio Franzini•
1. Introduction
Contracts are often incomplete, i.e. many obligations by the parties are
left unspecified ex ante and cumbersome ex post renegotiation is allowed.
Several authors have argued that this is due to uncertainty and to the
extremely high cost involved in the unambiguous description of a whole set
of contingent actions (Hart-Moore 1999). Several criticisms have been
leveled against this approach, arguing in particular that it lacks rigorous
analytical foundations (Maskin-Tirole, 1999)
These criticisms prompted different types of reaction. The transaction
cost approach has been defended and strengthened by its staunchest
advocates while alternative explanations have been set out. Among the
latter, Bernheim and Whinston (1998) argued that it might be optimal to
leave unspecified even aspects of the transactions that could be easily
described and verified, owing to complementarities with other unverifiable
aspects. Therefore, it is not a problem of transaction costs but of
complementarity.
A different perspective has been suggested by Mukerji (1998). His
approach is based upon the role that might be played by ambiguity, which in
this case is understood not as lack of clarity in writing the contract but as an
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2individual’s attitude in the presence of knightian uncertainty (ambiguity
henceforth).  Mukerji argues that ambiguity – in particular, ambiguity
aversion – may explain why people refrain from writing a well specified
contract, perhaps considering optimal a ‘null contract’ – the
‘quintessentially incomplete contract’, as Hart and Moore call it - which
relies on ex post renegotiation, when uncertainty will have been dissolved.
The introduction of ambiguity into the economic analysis of contracts
is a felicitous idea, as it may shed new light on several questions that have
so far been analyzed on the basis of a transaction cost approach, though not
too convincingly at times.
The aim of this paper is twofold. The first is to present a model of the
principal-agent type where, contrary to common assumptions, the Principal
is confronted not only with risk but also with ambiguity. In particular, it will
be shown that the optimal compensation scheme offered by the Principal to
the Agent will be quite different from that in the standard model.
The second purpose is to argue that ambiguity may not be a sufficient
condition for contract incompleteness. In fact, what is needed is a careful
comparison of the costs implied in both complete and incomplete contracts.
Ambiguity necessarily creates costs, and may enhance the attractiveness of
ex post renegotiation under ‘null contract’, as Mukerij argued. However,
sometimes ex post renegotiation may entail such high costs as to make it
desirable to have as complete a contract as possible from the start. In this
case a contract of the type we propose should be chosen. Very high costs of
ex post renegotiation in a Principal-Agent context arise, for instance, when
the agent selects a course of action that is catastrophic for the principal.  In
3another paper we showed how the model can apply to such a catastrophic
event as the Mad Cow Disease (Basili-Franzini, 2003).
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce
ambiguity and ambiguity aversion. In Section 3 we present and solve a
Principal-Agent model with unobservable effort and an ambiguity-averse
Principal. Concluding remarks are in Section 4.
2.  Ambiguity and ambiguity aversion
Decision theory under uncertainty describes how an individual does
and/or should choose between a set of alternatives, when the consequences
of each action are tied to events about which the individual is uncertain, i.e.
she does not know what will occur. The individual acts on the basis of a
well-defined utility function, which represents her preferences and involves
an evaluation of their consequences as well as their likelihood. The
individual maximizes her expected utility by weighting consequences with a
unique additive probability measure on the set of states of the world:
objective (von Neumann-Morgenstern 1944), subjective (Savage 1954) and
objective-subjective (Anscombe-Aumann 1963), so as to induce the
linearity of the functional preference. Given first order stochastic
dominance1, linearity of probabilities is a direct consequence of two very
similar axioms, the Independence Axiom in the von Neumann and
Morgenstern theory, and the Sure-thing Principle in the Savage theory.
                                                          
1 Given two acts X and Y with cumulative distribution functions FX and FY, X first order
stochastically dominates Y if FX(t)≤FY(t) for all t∈R. If an individual feels X at least as
favorable as Y, the cumulative distribution of the preferred prospect never exceeds that of
the inferior prospect.
4Experimental evidence has revealed systematic violations of the
Independence Axiom and the Sure-thing Principle that are inconsistent with
the hypothesis of expected utility maximization. The best known of these
violations is the Ellsberg Paradox (1961).
Consider the following version of the Ellsberg experimental thought.
Given an urn containing ninety balls, of which thirty are red, and the
remaining sixty are either blue or white, agents are allowed to extract one
ball only. Let fj = [α if r, β if b, χ if w] be a bet (or act), such that the
outcome is α if a red ball (r) is drawn, β if it is blue (b) and χ if it is white
(w). There are four possible bets (j=1,2,3,4), that is f1 = [100 if r, 0 if b, 0 if
w]; f2 = [0 if r, 100 if b, 0 if w]; f3 = [100 if r, 0 if b, 100 if w]; f4 = [0 if r,
100 if b, 100 if w]. Agents are asked to choose between two pairs of
lotteries, i.e. f1 and f2, then f3 and f4. Most agents (more than 70%) exhibit
the following strict preference f1 f  f2 and f4 f  f3. This observed behavior
leads to a contradiction (the Sure-thing Principle does not hold), since: f1 f
f2 implies pr>pb, while f4 f  f3 implies  pb+pw > pr + pw  or  pr < pb, where pi,
i=b, r, w denotes the probability of the event of a ball of color i.
These preferences contradict the expected utility theory and every
other theory of rational behavior under uncertainty that assumes a unique
additive probability measure over the states of the world. Hence, “it is
impossible, on the basis of such choices, to infer even qualitative
probabilities for the events in question…to find probability numbers in
terms of which these choices could be described - even roughly or
approximately – as maximizing the mathematical expectation of utility”
(Ellsberg 1961, p 655). The Ellsberg Paradox and recent experimental
5evidence (Camerer 1999) suggest that most people would rather make
unambiguous choices than ambiguous ones. Inducing evidence that
individual choices are not affected by “the relative desirability of the
possible payoffs and the relative likelihood of the events affecting them, but
…the nature of one’s information concerning the relative likelihood of
events. What is at issue might be called the ambiguity of this information, a
quality depending on the amount, type, reliability and unanimity of
information, and giving rise to one’s degree of confidence in an estimate of
relative likelihood” (Ellsberg 1961, p. 657).
Schmeidler (1989) and Gilboa (1987), in the Anscombe and Aumann
and Savage approach, respectively, axiomatize a generalization of expected
utility, which provides a derivation of utility and non-necessarily-additive
probability or capacity2 by the Choquet integral3 (Choquet 1954). The
individual expresses ambiguity aversion or pessimism if her non-additive
measure is convex4.  Indeed, she assigns greater probabilities to unfavorable
than to favorable states. Ambiguity may be represented by a set of possible
priors (additive probabilities) instead of a unique prior on the underlying
                                                          
2 Let Ω={w1,...,wn} be a non-empty finite set of states of the world and let Σ=2Ω be the set
of all events. A function µ:Σ→R+ is a non-necessarily-additive probability measure or a
capacity if µ(∅)=0, µ(Ω)=1and ∀ σ1,σ2∈Σ such that σ1⊃σ2, µ(σ1)≥µ(σ2). A capacity is
convex if ∀σ1,σ2∈Σ, µ(σ1∪σ2)+µ(σ1∩σ2)≥µ(σ1)+µ(σ2) and µ is super-additive if
µ(σ1∪σ2)≥µ(σ1)+µ(σ2) for σ1∩σσ2=∅.
3 The Choquet integral of a real-valued function f:Ω→R with respect to µ  is
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4 The convexity of the capacity is a sufficient condition for pessimism and encompasses the
conservative statement that an individual acts “as though the worst were somewhat more
likely than his best estimates of likelihood would indicate he distorted his best estimates of
likelihood, in the direction of increased emphasis on the less favorable outcomes and to a
degree depending on his best estimate” (Ellsberg 1961, p. 667).
6state space and her preferences are compatible with the maximin expected
utility decision rule.5
In this paper we consider E-capacities (Ellsberg capacities), which are
a “parameterized version of a capacity based on an additive probability
distribution that makes it possible to include known probabilities for a
partition of unambiguous events” (Eichberger-Kelsey 1999, p. 133). E-
capacities were introduced by Ellsberg (1961) and were axiomatized by
Eichberger and Kelsey (1999) to accommodate the observed Ellsberg
Paradox with the decision theory. E-capacities are a representation of the
beliefs of an individual that considers both her probability assessments for
events and the reliability (degree of confidence) of her probability
assessments. The principal has incomplete information, parameterized in her
degree of confidence, about the relationship between her utility and the
agent’s effort. The principal evaluates her expected utility, subject to the
agent’s effort, by combining her expected utility with respect to the most
reliable probability distribution and her worst possible expected utility, each
weighted by her degree of confidence.
Let Ω={w1,...,wn} be a non-empty finite set of states of the world and
let Σ=2Ω be the set of all events. Let g be an act, such that g:Ω→C, and let C
be the set of finite consequences. Let {E1,….,En} be a partition of Ω with
probabilities p(Ei), such that ∑
=
=
n
i
iEp
1
1)( , that is a partition of
                                                          
5 The maximin expected utility postulates that an agent with multiple priors looks at the
least value of expected utility for any act and chooses the act for which the minimum value
is greatest. Ellsberg (1961); Arrow-Hurwicz (1972); Gilboa-Schmeidler (1989);
Chateauneuf (1991).
7unambiguous events. Given an additive probability distribution π on Ω, let
)( pΠ be the set of information consistent additive probabilities, such that
∑
∈
=Ω∆∈=Π
iE
iEpp
ω
ωππ )}()()({:)( with i=1,2,…,n and for all A∈Ω let
{ }1,0:)( →ΩAiβ , such that →)(Aiβ {1 if AEi ⊆ ; 0 otherwise} be the
function characterizing events including at least one unambiguous event
(Eichberger-Kelsey 1999, p. 118).
Due to ambiguity aversion, the principal has to consider all the sets of
conditional probability distributions compatible with her incomplete
information on the basis of her degree of confidence ρ∈[0,1]. Consequently,
the E-capacity ),( ρπυ is ∑
=
−+∩=
n
i
iii AEpEAA
1
)()()1()([),( βρρπρπυ
∀A∈Ω. The Choquet integral of ),( ρπυ ”is a weighted average of the
expected utility with regard to an additive probability distribution and the
worst expected outcome obtained in the unambiguous events [and] this
Choquet integral is identical to a representation of preferences over actions
suggested in Ellsberg” (Eichberger-Kelsey 1999, p. 133).
83. A Principal-Agent model with unobservable effort under ambiguity
aversion
Consider the owner (principal) of a firm whose profit depends on the
actions taken by the manager (agent) she will hire (contingent events).6  The
principal’s utility depends on the profit and the latter depends, at least
partially, on the manager’s actions. The principal cannot observe the actions
taken by the agent (hidden action). Since the principal submits to the
manager a contract that designs his compensation, the compensation scheme
should give the agent the incentive to act with fairness. For simplicity’s
sake, only two qualities of the manager’s labor are assumed, low and high
effort. Thus, effort expresses the one-dimensional measure of the manager’s
labor quality. Nonetheless, the manager’s labor quality is neither observable
by the principal nor can it be perfectly inferred from profits. Hence it is
assumed that the principal utility is stochastically related to the agent’s
effort by a conditional density function.
The principal is ambiguity-averse (pessimist), with respect to the
relationship between quality of effort and profit, and she has more than one
additive conditional density function on contingent events. The principal
feels more confident of obtaining a high profit if the manager selects the
high effort, but she is unable to attach a unique probability to all the events
induced by the agent’s actions like in the Ellsberg Paradox. Given
ambiguity aversion, the principal has a conditional density function on
contingent events that she considers as her best estimate and a set of
additive conditional density functions that her “information - perceived as
9scanty, unreliable, ambiguous – does not permit [her] confidently to rule
out” (Ellsberg 1961, p. 661).
The principal maximizes her utility, which is the utility of the profit
less the agent’s wage. More specifically, she is an E-capacity maximizer
with a degree of confidence ρ∈[0,1]. If the information partition does not
contain only single element sets and the degree of confidence ρ equals 1,
there will be ambiguity about events, but the principal will feel her
probability assessment is correct. If the degree of confidence ρ equals 0, the
principal will attach a set of probability distributions over events, none of
which will be considered fully reliable (complete ambiguity).
Let u (φ)=φ be the principal utility (risk neutrality), with *],[ φφφ °∈
the low and high profit, respectively. Let e be the agent’s effort level, such
that e could be e° (low effort) or e* (high effort). Since the effort is not
observable, the relationship between profits and the agent’s effort level is
described by conditional density functions f(φ|e), with f(φ|e)≥0 for all e and
*],[ φφφ °∈ , all of which are information consistent. The cumulative
distribution function F(φ|e*) ≤ F(φ|e°) is assumed for all *],[ φφφ °∈ , with
strict inequality for some φ. This implies that the principal’s expected profit
is larger when e* holds.7
The agent is a risk-averse utility maximizer with a separable utility
function u(s,e)= )()( esv γ− , where v(s) is the utility of monetary wage s and
γ(e) represents the monetary equivalent of effort disutility, such that
                                                                                                                                                   
6 Our model has several features in common with the one developed in Mas-Colell-
Whinston-Green (1995).
7 F(φ|e*) ≤ F(φ|e°) implies first order stochastic dominance.
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)(*)( °> ee γγ . The agent’s utility increases with s and decreases with e,
both at decreasing rates; moreover *),(),( esuesu >° for all s.
 There is a conflict between the target of the principal and the purpose
of the agent. Given unobservable effort and ambiguity aversion, the
principal’s optimal contract solves the following problem:
∫∫
°°
−−+−
**
)(),()( })())((min)1()())(({
φ
φ
φ
φ
φφφ φφφφρφφφφρ defsdefsMax efss
[1]
such that
−
°
−
°
−
−
≥−
∫
∫
−
)()())(()(
)()())(()(
*
*
edefsvMaxii
uedefsvi
e
γφφφ
γφφφ
φ
φ
φ
φ
Condition (i) is a participation constraint, which shows that the agent
expected utility is at least equal to his reservation utility level 
−
u ; on the
other hand, condition (ii) is an incentive constraint, which assures the
agent’s optimal effort level e, under the compensation scheme s(φ).
Since the contract specifies effort level e, choosing φ  to maximize [1],
it is assumed that the principal has to minimize the expected value of the
agent’s wage, that is
∫∫
°°
−−+−
**
)(),()( })()(min)1()()({
φ
φ
φ
φ
φφφ φφφρφφφρ defsdefsMax efss           [2]
or
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Let us consider the case in which the principal’s purpose is to induce
effort level e*. Constraint (ii) can be written as:
)()())((*)(*)())(()(
**
°−°≥− ∫∫
°°
edefsvedefsviii γφφφγφφφ
φ
φ
φ
φ
[4]
Consider the problem [2] and assume that the co-state variables are
strictly positive8, s(φ) must satisfy the first order condition
0)]()*())[(('
*)())(('*)(^)1)(1(*)()1{
=°−+
++−−+−
efefs
efsvefef
φφφµν
φφλφρφρ
Where f^(φ|e*) is the minimum conditional density function with respect to
e* in the information consistent set.9 Dividing by f(φ|e)v’(s(φ)), the first
order condition becomes
0]
*)(
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1[)
*)(
*)(^
))(('
1
)(1()
))(('
1
( =
°
−++−−+−
ef
ef
ef
ef
svsv φ
φ
µλφ
φ
φρφρ [5]
or
                                                          
8 Co-state variables equal to zero are either impossible or induce the violation of the
constraints.
9 If the information consistent set only includes singleton, there is no ambiguity and the
degree of confidence does not matter.
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To evaluate how the wage varies with ρ, consider the derivative of [6] with
respect to ρ
]
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1[]
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*)(^
1[
))(('
1
ef
ef
ef
ef
sv φ
φ
µλφ
φ
φ
°
−+=− [7]
It turns out that  0)(]
*)(
*)(^
1[
))(('
1 ≥≤−
ef
ef
sv φ
φ
φ , that is the wage might
decrease or increase when ρ increases.
If ρ=1, the principal faces ambiguity but she is certain about the
correctness of her probability assessment. It appears as a special case of E-
capacity in which there is only a unique conditional probability function and
 ]
)*(
)(
1[
))(('
1
ef
ef
sv φ
φ
µλφ
°
−+= [8]
The compensation scheme pays more than in the case of observable effort10
for outcomes that are statistically more likely to occur under e* than under
e° and less for outcomes that are statistically more likely under e° than
under e*, respectively 1]
)*(
)(
[ <
°
ef
ef
φ
φ
 and 1]
)*(
)(
[ >
°
ef
ef
φ
φ
.
                                                          
10 When the effort is observable the optimal compensation scheme is λφ =))(('
1
sv
, the
payment is a constant and the manager would receive exactly his reservation utility level,
that is 
_
)())(( uesv =−
−
γφ .
13
If  ρ=0, the principal faces a condition of complete ambiguity and
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When the principal is ambiguity-averse, the optimal wage is lower
(respectively higher) than the compensation paid when the principal ignores
ambiguity if *)(*)(^ efef φφ >  (respectively *)(*)(^ efef φφ < ).
Roughly speaking, under ambiguity aversion the principal will pay less for
‘bad outcomes’, which are more likely given *)(^ ef φ than given *)( ef φ .
Instead, she will pay more for ‘good outcomes’, which are more likely given
*)( ef φ than given *)(^ ef φ .
Consider the case of ρ=
2
1
, or partial ambiguity. In this case:
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                                                        [10]
Other things being equal, an ambiguity-averse principal will pay a lower
wage in the face of bad events, which are more likely when
*)(*)(^ efef φφ > . On the other hand, the principal will pay a higher wage
for favorable events, which are more likely when *)(*)(^ efef φφ < .
14
Moreover when ρ =
2
1
, the optimal wage the principal offers the agent will
be higher for bad events and lower for favorable events than under complete
ambiguity.
Finally, consider the case in which the principal wants to implement
effort level e°. The principal will offer an optimal wage
)]([)( 1 °−=
−
− euvs γφ . Since the manager’s wage is unaffected by the level of
effort, he will always choose e°, that is the effort level with lowest disutility,
and will always receive 
−
u . The principal will offer a fixed
wage )]([1 °−=°
−
− euvs γ , when she either disregards or considers ambiguity.
 Our results show that the optimal wage could depend on the
principal’s ambiguity aversion.  In order to grasp the meaning of this result
one should bear in mind that, on the basis of our assumptions, the higher
effort e* is optimal also when the principal ignores ambiguity or has a less
pessimistic attitude. Therefore, the change in the wage function does not
have the goal of inducing effort e*, whereas the lower effort e° would be
chosen with less pessimistic probabilities or disregarding ambiguity.
Due to ambiguity, it may very well happen that the more pessimistic
probabilities alter the expected utilities attached by the principal to different
φ. This in turn implies that, in order to maximize her utility, the principal
will associate higher or lower wages to the various observed results,
according to the criterion specified above. Obviously, the chosen wage
function must be included among those, which fulfill the incentive and
utility constraints on the part of the agent. This effect of ambiguity can be
15
labeled "the welfare effect" on the wage. Alongside this, another effect can
be singled out. We shall call it the "higher effort inducing" effect. It takes
place when ambiguity makes it worthwhile implementing the higher effort,
whereas without ambiguity the lower effort would maximize profit.
4. Concluding remarks
Ambiguity is a very common condition in economic decision-making
under uncertainty. In this paper we have shown how the traditional results of
Principal-Agent theory are to be modified when an ambiguity attitude is
considered. Under our assumptions, the principal, though not the agent,
faces ambiguity as to the relation between her utility and the agent’s chosen
effort and, moreover, she is ambiguity-averse, i.e. her estimates are biased
toward pessimism.
 Under this assumption, the compensation scheme becomes rather
complex mainly because the confidence of the principal in the probability
distributions consistent with her informative set is an additional determinant
of the optimal wage paid to the agent in any conditional state of the world.
A contract which implements this type of compensation scheme may
be very costly to write and is not free from the risk of misinterpretation and
difficult verifiability. This means that an ambiguity attitude may lead to lack
of clarity in the interpretation of contractual agreements. The latter type of
ambiguity is often considered a cause of high transaction costs, which make
it better to revert to incomplete contract. Our model clarifies that, at least in
this respect, transaction costs may not be an explanation of incomplete
contracts entirely separate from uncertainty. Therefore, some apparently
16
alternative explanations of incomplete contracts, which we referred to in the
introduction, are not really alternative.
More important, however, is the point that, despite its costs, a
complete contract may still be preferable to a ‘null contract’ and ex post
renegotiation. That is true if under an incomplete contract the agent may
select as his best an action that leads with a positive probability to a
catastrophic event in terms of the principal’s utility function. Several
extremely important social situations share this feature: the case of
genetically modified organisms or of global warming. Under these
conditions the complete contract could be a better alternative despite its
costs.11 In this field, as in many others, a careful comparison of the
institutional alternatives should be carried out, in order to dodge all the
perils of the ‘Nirvana fallacy’ which Demsetz (1969) drew our attention to a
long time ago.
Making ambiguity an important feature of the transactions to be
analyzed and institutionally compared is an important step forward.
                                                          
11 Basili-Franzini (2003) apply the model to a peculiar type of catastrophic event, the so-
called Mad Cow Disease.
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